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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ALAN BOSWORTH SMITH, : Case No. 950640-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a Judgment for the conviction of the 
offense of tampering with evidence (a copy of the Judgment is 
attached hereto as Addendum A), entered after a jury trial by the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable David S. Young presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the State's failure to present legally 
sufficient evidence to establish that Smith tampered with 
evidence should have resulted in the dismissal of the charge, 
pursuant to Rules 17(o) and 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A conviction will be reversed if the 
evidence is sufficiently "inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
2. Whether the joinder of the separate and distinct 
offenses of manslaughter, failing to report the finding of a dead 
body, and tampering with evidence so affected the proceeding as 
to constitute a misuse of Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1995) and to 
deprive Smith of a fair trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The denial of a motion to sever counts 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 
50, 59 (Utah 1993). 
3. Whether the State's dilatory attempt to locate witness 
Othello Gerety ("Gerety") to testify during the trial failed to 
meet the "unavailability" prong of the "good faith efforts" test 
under Rule 804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, thereby rendering 
Gerety's prior testimony inadmissible hearsay at trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's ruling concerning the 
admissibility of evidence is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 
1991) . 
4. Whether the State's failure to secure Gerety's presence 
at trial violated Smith's constitutional rights to confrontation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's ruling concerning a 
constitutional question and the admissibility of evidence is a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. Id. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
1. Smith's Motion for Dismissal or New Trial, pursuant to 
Rule 17(o), Utah R. Crim. P., is preserved in the Record on 
Appeal ("R.") at 227-37. The trial court heard oral argument 
2 
concerning that motion and Smith's Motion for Arrest of Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 23. R. 696-709, 806-08, 823-24. 
2. Smith's Motion to Sever Counts I, II and III for 
Separate Trials, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1995), is 
preserved at R. 40-52. In addition, the trial court heard oral 
argument concerning that motion. R. 315-19. 
3. Smith's request to exclude the prior transcript 
testimony of Gerety as inadmissible hearsay is preserved at 
R. 400-04, 615-29, 651. 
4. Smith's request to exclude the prior transcript 
testimony of Gerety on the basis that admission of such testimony 
without the presence of Gerety at trial constituted a violation 
of Smith's rights under the federal and state constitutions is 
preserved at R. 400-04, 615-29, 651. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 17, The Trial; 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 23, Arrest of Judgment; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995), Tampering with Evidence; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1995), Joinder of Offenses and of 
Defendants; 
Utah Rules of Evidence 804, Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant 
Unavailable; 
Art. I, § 12, Utah Constitution, Rights of Accused Persons; 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution; 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. 
3 
The text of the above-identified provisions is contained in the 
attached Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, NATURE OF THE CASE, 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
In an Information dated February 24, 1995, and amended on 
June 27, 1995, the State charged appellant Alan Bosworth Smith 
("Smith") with Count I, criminal homicide, manslaughter, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995); 
Count II, failing to report the finding of a dead body, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(2)(a) 
(1995); and Count III, tampering with evidence, a second degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995). R. 11-
13, 141-43. 
The trial court refused to enter an order severing the 
charges and proceeded with a three-day jury trial on all three 
counts. During the trial, against Smith's objections the trial 
court permitted the State to introduce into evidence the prior 
self-serving statements of Othello Gerety, a witness who was not 
present to testify at trial. R. 651-90, 615-16, 625-28. 
On July 27, 1995, the jury rendered a verdict acquitting 
Smith of Count I and convicting him of Counts II and III. 
R. 219-224. On September 18, 1995, the trial court dismissed 
Count II and sentenced Smith to serve zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison for tampering with evidence, notwithstanding 
the State's failure to present legally sufficient evidence to 
establish the offense charged. R. 254. See Addendum A. Smith 
4 
appeals from the Judgment entered on September 18, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE OFFENSE OF TAMPERING 
WITH EVIDENCE. 
A. SMITH WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE EVENTS LEADING UP 
TO BARRETT'S DEATH. 
On the evening of February 20, 1995, John C. Barrett 
("Barrett") went to Smith's trailer home in Murray, Utah to visit 
friends. R. 522-23. Approximately 10 to 12 other people, 
including Valerie Mackert ("Mackert"), Othello Gerety ("Gerety"), 
Schuyler Olsen ("Olsen"), David Smith ("David"), and a man named 
"Kevin" ("Kevin"), were at the trailer at various times 
throughout the evening. R. 521-22, 580-83, 655, 710-11. 
Barrett brought heroin and cocaine with him. R. 656. He gave 
some of the drugs to people at the trailer, left at one point 
during the evening, and returned with more cocaine. R. 525-26. 
Throughout the evening, Gerety observed Barrett injecting himself 
with and ingesting drugs. R. 656. It is not clear from the 
evidence whether Barrett injected or ingested drugs that evening 
before he arrived at Smith's trailer. At or about midnight, 
Barrett collapsed after an injection that may have been 
administered by Gerety. R. 526-27, 532, 539, 585, 657. 
Smith was alone in his bedroom in the back of the trailer 
throughout the evening. R. 527-28, 53 8, 602, 73 9. He was 
summoned to help when Barrett collapsed. R. 527-28, 739. 
To revive Barrett, Kevin administered CPR; then Kevin and 
5 
Smith placed Barrett in a bathtub of cold water. R. 527-28, 602-
03. Barrett regained consciousness and was in the bathtub for up 
to 20 minutes talking and laughing with others. R. 528-29, 541-
42. Those at the trailer that evening believed Barrett would be 
fine. R. 528-29, 541-42, 588, 593, 675, 714-15. Smith and Kevin 
helped Barrett into a bed in Smith's spare room, R. 529-30, 602-
03, and the party broke up. R. 531. Smith, Gerety and Mackert 
stayed at the trailer that evening. R. 531, 602-03. 
According to the evidence, Smith did not provide drugs or 
supplies to Barrett or to the other people in the trailer and he 
was not injecting or using drugs. R. 542, 547, 585, 592, 671, 
673-76. Smith likewise did not witness Barrett or the others in 
the trailer using drugs. R. 527-28, 537-38, 739. 
B. THE EVIDENCE REFUTES THAT SMITH DISPOSED OF THE 
GARBAGE WITH A "PURPOSE" TO IMPAIR ITS VERITY OR 
AVAILABILITY IN ANY PROCEEDING OR INVESTIGATION. 
After the party, Smith and Gerety or Mackert placed garbage, 
including syringes, screens and other items, in a garbage bag. 
R. 602-04, 613, 667. Detective Alex Huggard ("Detective 
Huggard") testified that Smith had been after Gerety for some 
time prior to February 20, 1995, to dispose of possibly unused 
syringes in her possession and directed her that evening to throw 
them away. R. 613-14. The evidence at trial supports that the 
syringes thrown out after the party were the syringes that Smith 
asked Gerety to throw out. See R. 613-14, 666-68. 
Smith would have placed the garbage in the dumpster at the 
trailer park but it was full. R. 499, 838-39. He placed the 
6 
garbage in his jeep for disposal at a later time. R. 532-33, 
838-39. 
Throughout the night and during the morning of February 21, 
1995, Mackert and Gerety heard Barrett breathing and snoring in 
bed. R. 542, 662. Gerety checked Barrett between 4:00 and 
5:00 a.m. and testified that she detected a heartbeat. R. 662. 
Sometime during the morning of February 21, Smith stated that he 
believed Barrett had passed away. R. 531, 605.x 
Gerety became hysterical and agitated; she demanded that 
Smith and Mackert take her to Project Reality at 700 South 
between 1st and 2nd East in Salt Lake City for methadone. 
R. 531-32, 666. While Gerety was at Project Reality, Mackert and 
Smith went to a convenience store to purchase mixers. R. 534, 
838. Smith threw the garbage that was in the back of his jeep 
into the convenience store dumpster. R. 531-34, 605, 667-68, 838. 
Later that afternoon, Smith and Mackert returned to the 
trailer without Gerety. R. 535-36. Smith determined that Barrett 
had passed away and notified authorities of a fatal drug 
overdose. R. 484, 605. 
C. AT THE TIME SMITH DISPOSED OF THE GARBAGE, 
NEITHER HE NOR AUTHORITIES BELIEVED AN OFFICIAL 
PROCEEDING/INVESTIGATION WOULD BE INSTITUTED. 
Police detectives began arriving at the trailer on 
February 21, 1995, at approximately 3:20 p.m. Detective Deven 
Higgins ("Detective Higgins") did not consider the situation to 
1
 Experts testified that it was not possible to determine with 
certainty Barrett's time of death. R. 556. 
7 
be an official investigation; he questioned Smith for at least 3 0 
minutes and obtained a written statement from him concerning 
Barrett's death without advising Smith of his constitutional 
rights per Miranda. R. 486-89. He also informally interviewed 
Mackert with regard to Barrett's death. R. 489-90. 
In addition, Detective Huggard took Smith to the Murray City 
Police Station and conducted a cursory interview. R. 611. He did 
not consider the interview to be part of an official 
investigation or proceeding. Rather, he considered the matter to 
be a normal drug overdose case. R. 611, 64 0. When Detective 
Huggard asked Smith about "drug paraphernalia," Smith took police 
to the convenience store dumpster where he retrieved a garbage 
bag containing syringes, screens, baking soda, straws, and a 
glass vial. R. 599, 607, 640-41. Authorities testified that the 
items in the garbage bag would not have been recovered but for 
Smith, and that Smith was very helpful. R. 501-502, 607. 
An investigator from the Office of the Medical Examiner, 
John E. Foster ("Foster"), also examined the trailer premises on 
February 21, 1995. R. 423-424. Foster did not consider his 
review of the situation to be part of an official criminal 
proceeding or investigation. R. 43 6. 
On February 22, 1995, the Assistant Examiner for the Office 
of the Medical Examiner, Edward Leis, examined Barrett's body and 
determined that he had ingested a fatal dose of mixed drugs and 
alcohol. R. 458. Leis was not required to investigate the 
8 
trailer scene because the death initially had not been classified 
as a homicide. R. 474. Rather, authorities initially were 
treating the death as a self-induced drug overdose. R. 484, 611. 
D. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE ITEMS SMITH 
RETRIEVED FROM THE DUMPSTER HAD EVIDENTIARY VALUE TO 
ANY PROCEEDING OR INVESTIGATION. 
During the evening of February 21, 1995, Smith and Mackert 
were arrested and charged with criminal homicide, manslaughter 
(Count I); failing to report the finding of a dead body 
(Count II); and tampering with evidence (Count III). R. 11-13, 
141-43, 621. Gerety also was charged in connection with 
Barrett's death. R. 11-13, 617, 619, 621. The charges against 
Gerety and Mackert were dropped in exchange for their trial 
testimony. R. 538-39, 672, 684. 
During a jury trial, the State identified as 
Exhibit "S-6" a garbage bag containing garbage and other items 
that Smith retrieved from the dumpster on February 21, 1995. 
R. 606-609. The State did not elicit testimony concerning the 
specific contents of or findings relating to "S-6." (See R. 610-
11, where the State's witness testified that "bags" retrieved 
"possibly" had some garbage in them.) Rather, the State's 
witness testified that the State did not analyze or test the 
items for the presence of drugs. R. 637-38. The State failed to 
present evidence that the items contained in "S-6" were used by 
Smith, Barrett or anyone else on February 20, 1995, or at any 
time. The record is void of evidence linking the contents of 
"S-6" to the events of February 20, 1995, or to any investigation 
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or proceeding. See trial record in general; R. 524, 606-07, 638. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Smith of 
Count I, and convicted him of Counts II and III. R. 219-221. 
The trial court granted a Motion to Dismiss presented by Smith, 
R. 227-237, with respect to Count II and denied it with respect 
to Count III. R. 843-46. The trial court reduced Count III to a 
third-degree felony and sentenced Smith to serve zero to five 
years imprisonment and committed him forthwith. R. 846. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED SMITHS 
PRETRIAL MOTION TO SEVER THE CHARGES. 
Prior to trial, Smith requested that the charges be severed 
since the alleged events giving rise to the charges did not occur 
in a way that would suggest they were somehow linked or connected 
and they were not part of a common scheme or plan. R. 40-52, 
315-319. In addition, the State would be required to show very 
distinct elements unique to each charge. See R. 11-13 
(Information identifying elements of each charge). The trial 
court denied that motion. R. 150-51, 319. 
III. THE STATE FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE SHOWING 
THAT GERETY WAS UNAVAILABLE TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
Because Gerety was not present at trial, the State called 
Detective Higgins to testify concerning his efforts in locating 
her. R. 616-625. He stated that although he had a warrant for 
her arrest as of February 21, 1995, he was unable to locate 
Gerety for almost three weeks--until March 11, 1995. R. 617, 
621. He located her after questioning "an associate" of Gerety's 
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concerning her whereabouts and making inquiry at the University 
of Utah Hospital. R. 616-17. After Gerety was served with the 
warrant and after she testified at the preliminary hearing, 
Higgins lost track of her. R. 617-18. 
Notwithstanding the fact that it took Detective Higgins 
almost three weeks to locate Gerety in connection with her 
arrest, he did not begin to search for her again in order to 
serve her with a trial subpoena until July 5, 1995--less than 
three weeks before the trial. R. 623-25. His efforts included 
looking for the "associate" and checking the following locations 
for Gerety: two area hospitals, Project Reality, Pioneer Park, 
and the women's shelter on Rio Grande Street in Salt Lake City. 
R. 618. 
Detective Higgins was aware that Gerety had health problems 
and did not have a permanent residence. R. 618. Yet, he checked 
only two of several Salt Lake area hospitals, and he failed to 
utilize police resources or investigators to investigate whether 
she could be located outside the immediate Salt Lake City area. 
R. 624-25.2 
2
 Gerety's statements from the preliminary hearing were inconsistent 
and unreliable. Among other things, she testified that Smith 
disconnected the telephone on February 20, 1995, shortly after Barrett 
collapsed, and he prevented others from calling 9-1-1 for emergency 
assistance. R. 659-62. She also testified that she did not see Smith 
disconnect the telephone, R. 661; others disconnected the phone, R. 674-
75 ("I seen people pull the phone out") ; and several calls were received 
at the trailer throughout the evening, R. 664, 674-75. 
In addition, Gerety made the following exonerating statements, which 
further implicated Smith in drug use on February 20, 1995, and Barrett's 
death: (i) On February 20, 1995, Smith was in a room with Barrett 
injecting drugs, R. 657 (Gerety later admitted she was the person in a 
bedroom with Barrett injecting drugs, R. 676) ; and (ii) Gerety took 
(continued...) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Smith was charged with the offense of tampering with 
evidence as a result of cleaning his trailer after a party on 
February 20, 1995. In connection with such a charge, the State 
is required to prove each element of the offense. 
The State failed to meet its burden of proof in that it 
failed to demonstrate (i) that when Smith was house cleaning, he 
had reason to believe that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or would be instituted and that the 
items he threw out contained evidentiary value, and (ii) that 
Smith threw out the items with a purpose to impair their "verity 
or availability" in a pending or potential proceeding or 
investigation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1995). 
In addition, the trial court erred in failing to sever the 
charges against Smith at trial, since the alleged offenses were 
(...continued) 
heroic measures to revive Barrett, including administering CPR to him for 
four hours after he collapsed, R. 659, 661-65. The testimony of other 
trial witnesses contradicted Gerety's testimony as follows: (i) Gerety 
injected Barrett with the final and fatal dose, R. 532, 53 9, 542 
(testimony of Mackert); (ii) Smith was alone in a back room during the 
evening and was not involved in "partying" with the others, R. 523, 527-
28, 538, 585, 592, 739 (testimony of Mackert, David Smith and Olsen) ; and 
(iii) Kevin, not Gerety, administered CPR to Barrett after he collapsed, 
R. 527-28 (testimony of Mackert). 
Gerety also stated that she had ingested 15 units of cocaine and 25 
units of heroin during the evening of February 20, 1995, R. 671, placing 
her ability to recall the events of that night in question, and she 
admitted that in return for her self-serving and exonerating testimony, 
the homicide and other charges filed against her in connection with the 
events of February 20, 1995, would be dismissed. R. 672, 684. 
At the conclusion of Gerety's testimony at the preliminary hearing, 
counsel for Smith stated that although he had completed his questioning 
for purposes of that hearing, he had additional questions for Gerety 
relevant to the case and he requested the opportunity to question her 
further. R. 689-90. 
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not based on the same conduct or otherwise connected together in 
their commission. Also, the alleged offenses did not arise from 
a single criminal episode. 
The trial court also erred in permitting the State to 
introduce into evidence Gerety's statements from the preliminary 
hearing, since the State failed to make an adequate showing of 
unavailability under Rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Even if Gerety's prior statements had been admissible under 
the hearsay exceptions to the rules of evidence, they violated 
Smith's right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE OFFENSE OF 
TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-
510(1) REQUIRES THE STATE TO PRESENT LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT SMITH BELIEVED AN OFFICIAL 
INVESTIGATION OR PROCEEDING WOULD BE INSTITUTED AND 
THAT SMITH REMOVED EVIDENCE WITH A SPECIFIC PURPOSE. 
The ultimate burden of proving a criminal defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the State. See State v. 
Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1984); State v. Torres, 619 
P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 
140 (Utah 1978). If the State fails to prove each and every 
element of an offense, the defendant is entitled to a dismissal 
of the charge. Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o) and 23.3 
3
 Rule 17(o) provides the following: 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order 
(continued...) 
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To establish the offense of tampering with evidence, the 
State is required to prove each and every element set forth in 
the statute as follows: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, 
he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes 
anything with a purpose to impair its verity or 
availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; . . . .4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1995). In this matter, the State 
failed in its burden to present legally sufficient evidence to 
establish that offense. 
An examination of the sufficiency of the evidence presented 
at trial begins with the statute, as set forth below. See State 
v. Gibson, Case No. 950093-CA (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
6
 (...continued) 
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon 
the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish 
the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Likewise, Rule 23 provides that prior to the imposition of a sentence, 
the court may arrest judgment. The judgment may be arrested based on the 
insufficiency of evidence or facts as proved in trial. State v. Workman, 
806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
4
 The purpose of the statute is apparent: it deters conduct 
threatening the veracity and availability of evidence in a pending or 
potential official investigation or proceeding. See U.C.A. § 76-8-
510(1). Such statutes also have the legitimate purpose of requiring 
openness and citizen cooperation and involvement in solving crimes. See 
People v. Gray, 496 N.E.2d 1269, 1270 (111. Ct. App. 1986). 
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A. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT SMITH "BELIEVED" 
THE ITEMS MAY BE USED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING OR 
INVESTIGATION. 
1. The State Must Show That the Items at Issue 
Were Relevant to a Pending or Potential Proceeding 
or Investigation. 
In applying Utah's tampering statutes, Sections 76-8-508 and 
-510, the Utah appellate courts have acknowledged that the item 
(or person) that has been "tampered" with establishes or 
affirmatively disproves a fact relevant to a pending or potential 
proceeding or investigation. In State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 
(Utah 1977) , the defendant (the Superintendent of the Highway 
Patrol) secreted evidence establishing the blood-alcohol level of 
Willard Eccles, the Chairman of the Highway Patrol Civil Service 
Commission, at the time of an arrest for driving under the 
influence ("DUI"). When the secreted evidence came to light 15 
months later, Eccles pled guilty to the DUI charge. In affirming 
the tampering charge against the defendant, the court recognized 
that the blood-alcohol evidence was material in establishing the 
DUI offense. Id. at 796-97.5 
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that to be 
5
 See also State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1985) (conviction 
affirmed for tampering with results of breathalyzer machine, where 
results were relevant in establishing arrestee's blood-alcohol level); 
State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (tampering with 
evidence conviction affirmed although evidence, which was material in 
establishing possession of drugs offense, was suppressed); State v. 
Danker, 599 P. 2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979) (in connection with charge of 
tampering with witness, the state has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that an official investigation 
was in progress and that the person "would be a witness" in subsequent 
proceedings) ; State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1985) (defendant 
threatened a person who had been subpoenaed to testify in pending 
proceedings). 
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convicted of tampering with evidence or with a witness, the state 
must show that the defendant is aware that a proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted and that the 
item or the person that has been tampered with is relevant to 
establishing facts in the proceeding or investigation. A 
connection must be made between the alleged evidence and the 
pending or anticipated proceeding or investigation.6 
In this matter, the State failed to demonstrate the 
evidentiary value of the items Smith retrieved from the dumpster 
by linking them to a pending or potential investigation or 
proceeding. The State admittedly did not analyze the items, 
R. 637-38, and neglected to present evidence that the syringes 
had ever been used (either by Barrett or others). According to 
the evidence, the garbage bag contained possibly unused syringes 
that belonged to Gerety. See R. 613-14, 666-67. The State has 
failed to show how those syringes and other items are relevant to 
this matter or to any potential proceeding or investigation. 
The Florida Court of Appeals considered the application of 
6
 See Gill v. State, 622 So.2d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); 
State v. Murray, 349 So.2d 707, 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (in 
connection with the charge of tampering with a witness, the alleged 
victim must be or must have been a fact witness and the defendant must 
know that the alleged victim was a fact witness) ; State v. LaPointe, 418 
N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1988) ("closely related to the intent element is the 
requirement of proof that the bribe be made to a person the defendant 
believes 'has been or may be summoned as a witness' ") ; State v. Howe, 247 
N.W.2d 647, 653 (N.D. 1976) (in considering the application of a witness 
tampering statute: "All that is necessary is that the person be one who 
knows or is supposed to know material facts and is expected to testify 
to them or to be called on to testify"); State v. Peck, 459 N.W.2d 441, 
444 (S.D. 1990); United States v. Jackson, 513 F.2d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) ("Indubitably, one is a witness, within the meaning of [the witness 
tampering statute] , when he knows or is supposed to know material facts, 
and expectably is to be called to testify to them"). 
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Florida's tampering statute, which is substantially similar to 
the Utah statute, in a case similar in part to this matter. In 
Radar v. State, 420 So. 2d 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), two 
larcenists entered the defendant's home while he was out of town, 
committed larceny, and pawned the defendant's items for $47,500 
in cash. A third person, who shared an apartment with the 
larcenists, found $18,000 in the apartment and after one of the 
larcenists confessed to the larceny, the third person contacted 
the defendant and gave the money to his family. Id. 
Thereafter, the defendant contacted the police to report the 
larceny, the pawn-broker surrendered the items to the police, the 
defendant deposited $15,000 in cash in an account together with 
other funds (the $3,000 discrepancy was never explained), and the 
police took the defendant's statement concerning the larceny. 
Although the police requested for a month that the defendant 
relinquish the $15,000 to their custody as evidence relevant to 
the larceny, the defendant refused to comply with their request. 
The defendant also failed to disclose to the police that the 
money had been deposited in his account. Consequently, the 
defendant was charged with tampering with evidence. Id. 
At the trial on the tampering offense, the state failed to 
produce evidence that the money was "the proceeds of the 
larceny." The court stated the following: 
[T]here is no indication that the currency itself 
was subject to identification and thus its value as 
evidence is highly questionable. The state took a 
deposition from [the defendant] and never asked 
specifically the location of the money. We conclude 
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the evidence was insufficient and that the Court 
should have directed a verdict for defendant. 
Id. at 111. 
Unlike Radar, the State in this matter was in possession of 
the contents of the garbage bag since February 21, 1995. 
However, like Radar, the State failed to determine or to show 
whether the contents had evidentiary value in a pending or 
potential proceeding or investigation, or whether the contents 
somehow would lead the State to the discovery of evidence 
relevant to a proceeding or investigation. Consistent with 
Radar, the State's failure to demonstrate that the items had 
"evidentiary" value mandates the entry of an order dismissing the 
charge. 
2. The State Is Required to Show That Smith 
"Believed" the Items Were Evidence Relevant to a 
Pending or Anticipated Proceeding or Investigation. 
Since the legislature has defined the offense of tampering 
to include a mental state of actual belief that some official 
proceeding has been or is about to be commenced, the State "must, 
of course, establish this element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt by competent evidence." People v. Fraver, 661 
P.2d 1189, 1191 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 684 P.2d 927 (Colo. 
1983) (applying tampering statute similar to Utah Code Ann. §76-
8-510(1) (1995)). 
According to the evidence at trial, at the time Smith 
cleaned up and "removed" the garbage from the trailer, he could 
not have contemplated the proceedings that were ultimately 
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instituted.7 Authorities likewise did not contemplate such an 
investigation or proceeding. They testified that until after 
Smith retrieved the garbage, they were not treating the situation 
as a criminal or official investigation. To the extent 
authorities believed an investigation or proceeding would be 
instituted, they did not make overtures to Smith of that fact 
until after he had retrieved the garbage from the dumpster. See 
Facts, subsection I.e., supra. Consequently, at the time Smith 
cleaned up the trailer, he had no reason to believe the garbage 
had evidentiary value. 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW THAT SMITH ALTERED, 
DESTROYED, CONCEALED OR REMOVED THE ITEMS WITH A 
"PURPOSE" TO IMPAIR THEIR VERITY OR AVAILABILITY IN 
A PROCEEDING/INVESTIGATION. 
The State must show as an element that when Smith "removed" 
the garbage, he had purpose or intent to impair its verity or 
availability. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989) (evidence must be 
sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant knowingly or 
intentionally tampered with witness); State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 
7
 According to Detective Huggard, Smith stated to him during an 
unrecorded interview that the reason he cleaned up the trailer was that 
Smith "didn't think that [Barrett] would make it and [Smith] didn't want 
to have the drug paraphernalia there with [Barrett] when the police 
[came] and found the body." R. 631. Detective Huggard acknowledged that 
the alleged statement was inconsistent with other statements Smith made 
to him, R. 631, and Detective Huggard admitted at trial that he could not 
recall precisely what Smith said during the unrecorded interview. R. 
630. In addition, the alleged statement is inconsistent with the 
testimony of Mackert, Gerety, Olsen and David Smith. They all testified 
that they and Smith believed that Barrett would be fine. R. 528-29, 541-
42, 588, 593, 675, 714-15. 
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567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Such culpability can be implied 
from the actions of the defendant, but the evidence must be clear 
enough that the jury does not have to guess that such purpose or 
intent existed. Harman, 767 P.2d at 569. 
In State v. Helm, 563 P.2d at 796, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the jury reasonably inferred from the facts that 
the defendant had the requisite state of mind to "conceal or 
remove" evidence in violation of Section 76-8-510(1), based on 
the following facts: 
[T]hat there was an official investigation under 
way; that the defendant Helm took possession of 
evidence relating to it; and that nothing further 
was seen or heard of it until fifteen months later. 
Id. The evidence is not so sufficiently clear in this case. 
Requisite "purpose" cannot be inferred since (i) there was no 
official proceeding or investigation under way or contemplated at 
the time Smith "removed" the garbage from the trailer;8 
(ii) there was no showing by the State that Smith took possession 
of evidence relevant to establishing or disproving facts in an 
investigation or proceeding (see Argument, Point I.A.I, supra); 
and (iii) Smith was open with officials and helpful in that he 
immediately retrieved the items from the dumpster when the 
officers requested them. See Facts, subsection I.C., supra. 
Because cleaning up after a party and throwing out garbage 
harmonizes with ordinary experience and common sense, the jury is 
left to guess whether "intentional" or "knowing" conduct in 
For a marshaling of the evidence, see notes 2 and 7, supra. 
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violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1995) existed; it 
cannot be inferred. (See note 8, supra); see State v. News-Press 
Pub. Co., 338 So. 2d 1313, 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) 
(erasing murder tape in normal course of business does not show 
"purpose"); State v. Wooden, 619 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993) (insufficient evidence to sustain conviction where purpose 
was not clearly shown and many possible explanations existed for 
throwing away the gun used to fire at an officer). 
Given the insufficiency of the evidence as set forth above, 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Smith committed the offense of tampering with evidence. 
Consequently, the conviction must be reversed and the charge must 
be dismissed. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SMITH'S 
MOTION TO SEVER THE CHARGES. 
A. THE COURT MAY LOOK TO STATUTES IN SISTER STATES 
FOR ASSISTANCE IN CONSTRUING SECTION 77-8a-l. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l in part provides the following: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, 
may be charged in the same indictment or information 
if each offense is a separate count and if the 
offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise 
connected together in their commission. 
* * * 
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
or defendants in an indictment or information or by 
a joinder for trial together, the court shall order 
an election of separate trials of separate counts, 
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other 
relief as justice requires. 
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Since the enactment of § 77-8a-l, the Utah appellate courts have 
had limited opportunity to interpret the statute, see State v. 
Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Utah appellate 
courts have yet to interpret section 77-8a-l (1)"),9 and will 
look to the decisions of other states interpreting similar 
language for assistance. Id. 
1. The Phrase "Based on the Same Conduct" Is 
Construed to Mean That Crimes Charged Against a 
Defendant and Occurring Under Identical 
Circumstances May Be Joined at Trial. 
The phrase "same conduct" is construed by courts to mean 
identical conduct: facts giving rise to two (or more) separate 
crimes are identical and therefor are based on the "same 
conduct." In State v. Lucas, 708 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1985), the court 
determined that the joinder of two separate crimes was 
appropriate where they were based on the "same conduct" or 
otherwise connected. The crimes occurred 24 hours apart; in both 
instances, the defendant befriended a female victim in a bar, 
persuaded her to leave with him, then used a weapon to coerce the 
victim to perform sex acts. See also State v. Esham, 321 A.2d 
9
 in State v. Lee, 831 P. 2d at 117, this Court construed Section 77-
8a-l(l)(b), which provides for joinder if the offenses charged are 
"alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan." That provision 
is inapplicable to this case since it has been construed by this Court 
to mean the following: offenses are part of a common scheme or plan if 
the separate counts refer to the same type of offense with parallel fact 
patterns. The existence of the parallel fact pattern demonstrates a 
calculated plan. Id. at 117-18. In addition, the State conceded that 
the language of Section 77-8a-l(l)(b) was inapplicable to this matter. 
R. 318-19 ("the State argues no scheme or plan, we don't believe there 
was a scheme or a plan in here."). 
It is relevant to note that in construing that provision, this Court 
considered the severance/joinder laws of Arizona, Idaho and Missouri. 
Because the Missouri statute does not contain the language, "connected 
together in their commission", it is not instructive. 
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512, 514 (Del. 1974) ("'same conduct7 means identical conduct"). 
Since the charges of homicide, failing to report the finding 
of a dead body, and tampering with evidence in this matter did 
not occur under "identical" circumstances, the "same conduct" 
language of the statute is inapplicable. 
2. A Connection Must Be Drawn Between the Crimes 
Before They May Be Joined As "Otherwise Connected" 
Under the Statute. 
In construing the "otherwise connected" language, courts in 
jurisdictions with similar statutes have ruled that the crimes 
must be directly linked together to be "otherwise connected" in 
their commission. In State v. Martinez-Villareal, 702 P.2d 670 
(Ariz. 1985), cert, denied, 106 S.Ct. 339 (1985), the court found 
that the crimes of burglary and murder were properly joined where 
the murder weapons came from the burglary, authorities found 
other property from the burglary at the scene of the murder, the 
defendant was in possession of property from the burglary and had 
possession of the murder weapons. The crimes were linked 
together. IdL at 675.10 
The court in Martinez-Villareal, recognized that joinder has 
been approved under Federal Rules ot Criminal Procedure 8(a) under the 
following circumstances: (i) where "most of the evidence admissible as 
proof of one offense was also admissible in proof of another"; (ii) where 
^the offenses arose out of a series of connected acts, and the evidence 
as to each count, of necessity, overlaps"; or (iii) where there "were 
common elements of proof in the joined offenses". JId. at 675. 
Consideration of the Rule 8(a) factors compels the determination 
that the charges in this matter should not have been joined. First, as 
set forth in Point II.B.3. of the Argument, infra, most of the evidence 
admissible in connection with the homicide ottense would not have been 
admissible as proof of the tampering offense. Second, as set forth in 
Point I.A. of the Argument, supra, the State failed to demonstrate that 
the alleged offenses arose out ot a series of connected acts. Third, the 
State is not required to prove the same elements in the separate charges 
of homicide and tampering with evidence. (Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205 (homicide) to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (tampering).) 
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Likewise, in State v. Bravo, 639 P.2d 358, 359 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1981), the court determined that charges for aggravated 
assault and tampering with a witness were properly joined. The 
offenses were connected in their commission where the witness was 
also the victim of the assault. See also Ghent v. Superior Court 
of Santa Clara County, 153 Cal. Rptr. 720, 730 (Ct. App. 1979) 
(assault with intent to commit rape and murder charges were tried 
together since they were "connected in their commission"; the 
unsuccessful rape provided the motive for the subsequent assault 
and murder committed shortly thereafter). 
As set forth above (Argument, Point I.A, supra), in this 
matter the State failed to demonstrate how Barrett's death, the 
alleged failure to report the finding of a dead body, and the 
garbage that Smith retrieved for authorities from the dumpster 
were connected. Since the events have not been linked together, 
it was error for the trial court to refuse to sever the charges. 
B. SECTION 77-8a-l(4)(a) SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED 
TO SEVER THE COUNTS. 
Even if the charges against Smith were properly joined under 
Section 77-8a-l(l), the trial court nevertheless abused its 
discretion in failing to sever the counts pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-8a-l(4)(a) (1995) since presenting the charges together 
to the jury unduly prejudiced Smith. 
In determining whether joinder unduly prejudices a 
defendant, courts contemplate whether (a) the jury will consider 
the defendant "a bad man and tend[] to accumulate evidence 
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against him until it finds him guilty of something," State v. 
Campbell, 615 P.2d 190, 198 (Mont. 1980); State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985); State v. Warren, 779 P.2d 1159, 1165 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 788 P.2d 1078 (Wash. 1990) 
(citing State v. Redd, 754 P.2d 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)); 
(b) the defendant will be compromised or "embarrassed" in 
presenting joined defenses, Warren, 779 P.2d at 1165; or (c) the 
evidence of other crimes would be inadmissible if the crimes were 
charged separately. Id.; Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741; State v. 
Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1986). 
A review of all three considerations weighs in favor of 
severing the charges against Smith. 
1. By Considering the Homicide Charge with the 
Tampering Charge, the Jury Improperly Accumulated 
Evidence Against Smith to Find Him Guilty of 
Tampering. 
In Saunders, 699 P.2d at 738, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sever 
charges of (i) possession of a firearm by a restricted person and 
(ii) theft and burglary, since joinder of such offenses unduly 
prejudiced the defendant. The court recognized that the evidence 
implying that the defendant had committed the firearm offense 
permitted the jury to consider highly prejudicial evidence which 
would not have been admissible at trial on the burglary and theft 
charges alone. Id. at 741. The court emphasized the prejudicial 
impact of evidence of other crimes, as follows: 
The basis of these limitations on the admissibility 
of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a 
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fact finder to convict the accused because of bad 
character rather than because he is shown to be 
guilty of the offenses charged. Because of this 
tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial and, 
absent a reason for the admission of the evidence 
other than to show criminal disposition, the 
evidence is excluded. 
Id. at 741 (footnote omitted). 
In State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1370, the court held that 
the joinder of three offenses of receiving stolen property was 
unduly prejudicial: "[T]he prejudicial impact upon a jury 
listening to evidence relating to three separate charges cannot 
be underestimated." Id. 
In the present case, the charge of homicide would 
necessarily have a cumulative effect and cause the jury to view 
Smith as a bad person. See generally State v. McCumber, 622 P. 
353, 353-56 (Utah 1980). The prosecutor in the case used the 
existing homicide charge to buttress his case against Smith for 
tampering. He stated the following in closing argument: 
[Smith] acted recklessly, he was aware of a whole, 
whole lot of risk and he made conscious elections to 
do other things, and but for that, [Barrett] would 
have not died at that time and place. Like I said, 
I can't tell you whether he'd have overdosed on 
heroin if he'd lived through that night or he'd been 
run over by a truck, or if any one of us is going to 
live for another week because of circumstances of 
life. 
But I think you all know that the evidence was 
ditched, that they failed to report the body and 
that [Smith] made a whole lot of elections for the 




Hence, the joinder of the charges in this case had the 
improper effect of accumulating evidence and causing the jury to 
view Smith as a bad person predisposed to criminal conduct. 
2. The Jury Compromised by Convicting Smith of 
Tampering. 
The second consideration, whether joinder embarrassed or 
compromised the defendant in the presentation of his defense, 
likewise weighs in favor of severing the charges. See note 11, 
supra. Although Smith was not involved in the events of 
February 20, 1995, the suggestion by the State that he somehow 
should be held responsible for Barrett's death overrode and 
compromised the issues relating to the tampering charge. 
3. Statements and Suggestions Implicating Smith in 
Barrett's Death Would Have Been Inadmissible if the 
Charges Had Been Brought Separately. 
The final consideration in assessing prejudice is a 
determination as to whether statements relating to the charge of 
11
 Even the trial court recognized that the cumulative evidence 
prejudiced Smith. Judge Young stated the following: 
Now, you have this homicide part of the trial, the 
manslaughter part of the trial in there where Mr. Smith did not 
inject fne drugs. [He] provided the home. [He] did not call 9-1-1, 
dia not do anything other than let [Barrett] sleep the night, 
thinking [Barrett] was coming out of his overdose and then founa him 
dead in the morning. 
Now, he -- with that part in the trial, it seems to me that 
the jury could well have thought, well, look, if we take [the 
homicide] part out, we can convict him of the failure to report and 
of the tampering with evidence. 
Well, this is a -- I will tell you, this has been a major 
difficulty for me to deal with, because I will say that it is my 
belief that there was -- that the jury was correct by not convicting [Smith] on the manslaughter [charge] and that the manslaughter 
charge overrode all of the rest of the case. 
R. 833, 841. 
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homicide against Smith would have been admissible at a separate 
trial for tampering. See Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. 
The admissibility of evidence is severely restricted under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(b) precludes the 
introduction of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts unless 
the evidence shows motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. 
Rule 4 03 precludes the introduction of cumulative evidence or 
evidence that will unfairly prejudice the defendant, confuse the 
issues, mislead the jury, unduly delay the trial, or waste time. 
Rule 609 prohibits the introduction of a criminal conviction 
except in limited circumstances. 
Because the jury acquitted Smith of the offense of homicide, 
the State's evidence and statements implicating Smith in 
Barrett's death would have been inappropriate and inadmissible 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence in a separate trial for 
tampering. "Evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the 
defendant is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the 
defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to 
commit crime and thus likely to have committed the crime 
charged." State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978); see 
also State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (evidence of 
unprosecuted offenses improperly admitted had a strong tendency 
to suggest to the jury that defendant was guilty of the charged 
crime). The State would have been limited to presenting evidence 
that after the party broke up, Smith cleaned up the trailer. 
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Since Smith's conduct in throwing out garbage was never 
connected by the State to Barrett's death, the existence of the 
homicide charge "tended to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the 
fact-finding process." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 
(Utah 1988). 
C. THE OFFENSES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN JOINED UNDER 
RULE 9.5. 
Rule 9.5 provides that "unless otherwise provided by law" 
information charging multiple offenses "arising from a single 
criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401" shall be filed 
in a single court. Since Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4)(a) requires 
that the charges in this matter be severed to avoid prejudicing 
Smith (see Argument, Point II.B., supra), Rule 9.5 is 
inapplicable. 
Even if Section 77-8a-l(4)(a) did not require severance of 
the charges, Rule 9.5 is inapplicable. The "multiple offenses" 
charged in this matter did not arise from a single criminal 
episode, which encompasses "all conduct which [i] is closely 
related in time and [ii] is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-401 (1995). See State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203, 206-07 (Utah 
1983) (offenses were not related in time where they occurred 
hours apart, and defendant was not motivated by same objective); 
State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977) (offenses were not 
related in time where they were committed a day apart); State v. 
Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977) (court determined that two 
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offenses were not connected in time because the amount of time 
necessary to drive 65 miles had lapsed between them); Hupp v. 
Johnson, 606 P.2d 253, 254 (Utah 1980) (separate, independent 
driving offenses and drunk driving charge were not part of single 
criminal episode); State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
Neither element of the statute is satisfied in this matter. 
With respect to the first element, the alleged offenses were 
committed approximately 17 hours apart. See Facts, generally, 
and R. 760 (17 hour lapse in time). Consistent with Cornish, 
Ireland, and Bair they were not closely related in time. 
The second element in the statute examines whether the 
defendant was motivated by the same objective to complete the 
alleged offenses. This Court ruled in Strader, that the facts 
must be viewed "objectively to determine whether there exists a 
common criminal objective. It would be inappropriate to decide 
the question based on whatever subjective intent the defendant 
may allege for the offenses at issue." Strader, 902 P.2d at 
642-43. 
In this matter, the record contains no evidence to support 
the notion that Smith was motivated by a single objective to 
commit the alleged offenses. An objective review of the record 
reflects just the opposite as argued by the State: according to 
the prosecutor, Smith allegedly committed homicide to avoid being 
implicated in the "risks" of drug use in his home, R. 759, 785; 
Smith allegedly committed the offense of failing to report a dead 
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body for selfish reasons --so that he could "go out and do other 
things", R. 761; Smith allegedly committed the offense of 
tampering with evidence "in anticipation of the police coming 
[over] with the death of Mr. Barrett". R. 759, 788. By the 
State's own admissions, Smith was not motivated by the same 
objective to complete the alleged offenses. 
D. PRESENTING THE SEPARATE COUNTS TO A SINGLE JURY 
VIOLATED SMITH'S RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution provide in part that no person shall be deprived "of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law."12 Due 
process has long been recognized as a consideration in decisions 
to join or sever counts and care must be taken to balance the 
interests of the defendant with considerations of economy and 
judicial administration, with doubts being resolved in favor of 
severance. See State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Utah 
1986); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979). 
Without specifying whether the due process analysis derives 
from the state or the federal constitution, the Utah Supreme 
Court repeatedly has recognized the prejudicial impact of 
allowing a jury to hear evidence of other crimes or alleged bad 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that Article I, § 7 of the 
Utah Constitution provides greater protection in some contexts than is 
provided by its identical federal counterparts. See State v. Ramirez, 
817 P. 2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) (greater scrutiny given to eyewitness 
identification testimony under Utah due process protection); Foote v. 
Board of Pardons, 808 P. 2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (state due process 
protection applies to Board of Pardon proceedings). 
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acts, and has determined that the admission of such evidence 
violates a defendant's rights to due process and to a fair trial. 
See, e.g., McCumber, 622 P.2 at 353; Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741; 
State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 556 (Utah 1989); Tarafa, 720 P.2d 
at 1370. 
In State v. Gotfrev, 598 P.2d at 1325, the Utah Supreme 
Court considered severance of charges and stated the following: 
[T]he defendant is entitled to a trial without any 
error of sufficient substance that in its absence 
there is a reasonable likelihood that there would 
have been a different result. We cannot conclude 
with assurance that the joinder of these three 
offenses, and allowing the jury to hear evidence of 
all three of them together in a single trial, did 
not so affect the proceeding as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial. 
Id. at 1328 (emphasis added). 
Other courts likewise have employed a due process analysis 
to the joinder of offenses. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 
85 (D.C. Cir. 1964), recognized that a danger to joinder of 
charges is that a jury may infer a criminal disposition and 
thereby prejudice the defendant, or the jury may view the 
evidence cumulatively or view the defendant with latent 
hostility, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. Those concerns 
are consistent with the concerns articulated in Gotfrev, 
McCumber, and Saunders. 
In this matter, the charge of homicide tainted the trial 
with respect to the charge of tampering with evidence. Jurors 
considered Barrett's death, rather than the innocuous and 
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purposeless conduct of Smith cleaning house after the party, in 
convicting Smith of the offense of tampering with evidence. 
Had the trial court conducted separate trials on the 
charges, the verdict on the tampering charge may very well have 
been different; the State's suggestions that Smith committed 
homicide would have been inappropriate and prejudicial since 
Smith was not convicted of that crime. The evidence would have 
shown nothing out of the ordinary -- that after the party broke 
up, Smith cleaned up the trailer. Smith likely would not have 
been convicted of the offense of tampering with evidence. Where 
errors result in the erosion of confidence in the verdict, 
reversal of the conviction is required and a new trial must be 
ordered. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988) (citing 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Crim. 
P. 30(a)). 
POINT III. GERETY'S PRIOR STATEMENTS WERE 
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY SINCE THE STATE FAILED TO MAKE 
A SUFFICIENT SHOWING OF UNAVAILABILITY. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted." Rule 802 further states that "[h]earsay 
is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." 
In this matter, the State sought to introduce Gerety's prior 
statements into evidence under Rule 804(b)(1), "which permits the 
recorded testimony of an unavailable witness to be used if it was 
given at another hearing of the same or different proceeding and 
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if the opposing party had an opportunity to develop the testimony 
through cross examination." State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356, 357 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988), 
overruled on other grounds. State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 912, 
914 (Utah 1988) . 
Rule 804(a) (5) defines "unavailability" as the witness being 
absent and the "proponent of his statement has been unable to 
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means." 
The State bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the 
unavailability of a witness before introducing hearsay statements 
into evidence. See State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). 
In Drawn, this Court determined that a search consisting of 
successfully serving subpoenas on each witness, attempting to 
make personal contact with each witness, and questioning police 
informants, searching police files, and working with 
investigators to locate each witness complied with the hearsay 
exception unavailability requirements. Id. at 893. 
Conversely, in State v. Case, 752 P.2d at 356, this Court 
stated that although the state sent a subpoena to the witness, 
which she acknowledged receiving, had personal contact with her 
"approximately eight times" before the trial, and attempted to 
keep close contact with her, the state's efforts were not 
sufficient to show unavailability when the witness failed to 
appear for trial. "At [the prosecutor's] disposal was the 
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a 
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State in Criminal Proceedings . . . This was not used." Id. at 
357. Without use of the Uniform Act, "the prosecutor did not 
make use of the 'reasonable means' required to meet the 
definition of 'unavailability.'" Id. at 357. See also State v. 
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982) ("The state, having had 
advance notice of the unwillingness of a witness to appear 
voluntarily, and having made no effort to secure his attendance 
by means of the Uniform Act, did not demonstrate sufficient good 
faith to meet the 'unavailability' test referred to earlier"). 
According to the evidence in this case, the State had "clear 
indications that the witness would not attend or . . . had 
obvious means of obtaining those indications," Case, 752 P.2d at 
357, where the State had not served a subpoena on Gerety for her 
attendance at trial and had waited until less than three weeks 
before the trial to begin searching for her. Although the State 
was aware of Gerety's health problems and homelessness, it 
checked only two of several Salt Lake area hospitals, and it 
failed to utilize any resource to investigate whether she could 
be located outside the immediate Salt Lake City area. The 
State's efforts in securing Gerety's attendance at trial were 
cursory and limited. In this situation, utilization of other 
sources, such as the Uniform Act, informants, and investigators, 
should have been obvious to the State and a condition precedent 
to the use of the prior testimony. Chapman, 655 P.2d at 1122-23. 
Because Gerety did not attend the trial to testify, the 
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State's case was easier and cleaner. The State was not required 
to put a homeless, former heroine addict on the stand to testify, 
and did not have to run the risk of presenting an unsympathetic, 
perhaps offensive witness to the jury. R. 679, 676. Rather, the 
State arranged for the prosecutor's secretary to sit on the 
witness stand and read Gerety's testimony. R. 628-29, 653-54. 
Surely the prosecutor's secretary was a poised, non-
confrontational, unoffensive, and preferable alternative to 
Gerety. Because the State failed to demonstrate unavailability 
under the rules of evidence, the case must be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
POINT IV. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO SHOW CONSTITUTIONAL 
UNAVAILABILITY VIOLATED SMITH'S RIGHTS UNDER THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE. 
Even if Gerety's prior statements may be admissible under 
certain hearsay exceptions to the rules of evidence, they violate 
Smith's constitutional rights of confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and therefore are 
inadmissible. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1989)). 
The Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provide all who 
are criminally accused with the right to confront witnesses. In 
order to comply with those provisions, the State is required to 
make two showings: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
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normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. 
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it 
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see also Menzies, 889 P.2d 
at 402 (a two-prong test is considered in determining the 
admissibility of hearsay under the confrontation clause: first, 
there must be a showing of unavailability, and second, the 
testimony must bear sufficient indicia of reliability); State v. 
Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539, 542 (Utah 1981) ("[T]he Utah 
Constitutional provision, Article I, Section 12, should be 
construed the same as the Federal Constitutional provision"). 
The Confrontation Clause appears to require a stronger 
showing of unavailability and reliability than does Rule 804. 
See Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69, 72 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(considering "unavailability" under the confrontation clause of 
the federal constitution). "It must be practically impossible to 
produce the witness in court . . . . Every reasonable effort 
must be made to produce the witness." State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 
1108, 1113 (Utah 1989). 
Whether "unavailability" and the admission of hearsay 
testimony will infringe on the rights of confrontation depends on 
the role a particular witness plays in the prosecution's case, 
especially in light of the defense's trial strategy. "Testimony 
providing cumulative evidence, or addressing a portion of the 
prosecution's case that the defense has not disputed or does not 
intend to dispute, might be admitted more readily than testimony 
not sharing these characteristics." Ecker, 69 F.3d at 72. 
However, "when witnesses tell conflicting versions of 
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events, conventional wisdom suggests that a jury's evaluation of 
the demeanor of the witnesses could assist the fact-finding 
process." Id. Trial courts should take care to ensure that the 
omission of live cross-examination at trial does "not tip the 
balance . . . against [a] defendant." United States v. Faison, 
679 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1982).13 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has hesitated to mandate use 
of the Uniform Act in a showing of "unavailability" as a 
condition precedent to the use of prior testimony, the court has 
recognized that such a mandate "would be preferable to serious 
and repeated attempts by the state to infringe upon the right of 
confrontation." Chapman, 655 P.2d at 1122-23. Indeed, the 
In its review of "constitutional unavailability" the Ecker court 
also considered the extent of and motive for cross-examining witnesses 
in state preliminary hearings designed to determine probable cause to 
hold the defendant for trial. Although the Utah courts have determined 
that "preliminary hearing testimony usually meets the [constitutional] 
reliability standard", Menzies, 889 P. 2d at 403; Brooks, 638 P. 2d at 540, 
the court in Ecker retused to disregard important considerations 
surrounding pre-trial cross-examination. The court stated: 
[T]rial courts should examine the extent of and motive for the 
cross-examination of the witness at the prior hearing or trial. 
Defense counsel may have less motive or opportunity to cross-examine 
a witness at a pre-trial proceeding than at a trial. . . . [C]ross-
examination may not be as complete because such questioning can 
disclose defense strategy in a proceeding not designed to address 
the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Alternatively, the pre-
trial hearing testimony may address a collateral issue, the nature 
of a search, for instance, and thus defense counsel's cross-
examination might not address a more substantive issue that happened 
to be included in the witness's direct testimony . . . Especially 
in the last circumstance, trial courts should be wary of admitting 
testimony when defense counsel did not have sufficient motive or 
opportunity to cross-examine the relevant witness. 
Ecker, 6 9 F. 3d at 72. In this matter Smith's counsel did not explore the 
full merits of the case, but stated that he would reserve further 
questioning of Gerety for a later date. That is not unusual since a 
preliminary hearing is "not to be considered a full trial on the merits." 
State v. Anderson, 612 P. 2d 778, 786 (Utah 1980) . Because Gerety did not 
attend trial, Smith did not have the opportunity to fully develop his 
case. 
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court supported such a mandate "where the party had clear 
indications that the witness would not attend or where the party 
had obvious means of obtaining those indications but neglected to 
do so." .Id. (See Argument, Point III, supra.) 
In this case, the State attempted to locate Gerety in 
February and March 1995 to serve her with an arrest warrant. 
When the State began again to search for her to serve her with a 
trial subpoena, (1) the State knew Gerety suffered health 
problems but checked only two area hospitals; (2) the State knew 
Gerety did not have a permanent address but made no inquiries and 
conducted no searches outside the downtown Salt Lake area; and 
(3) the State waited until less than three weeks before trial to 
begin its search, yet it had taken the State three weeks to 
locate Gerety in connection with the arrest warrant. "Half-
hearted last minute efforts, as here, . . . are insufficient to 
demonstrate good faith and override the defendant's 
constitutional rights of confrontation at trial." Id.; see also 
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645 (Utah 1995) (unavailability 
shown where state continued efforts to locate witnesses from 
"time to time over the last few years" and had utilized federal 
authorities7 expansive efforts to locate them as fugitives from 
the law); Brooks, 638 P.2d at 540 ("good faith effort" included 
contacting local bus terminals and out-of-state police). 
Gerety's testimony prejudiced Smith. She suggested that 
Smith was paranoid of police on February 20, 1995, because, 
according to Gerety, Smith was implicated in drug use that 
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evening and Barrett's death. See note 2, supra. The testimony 
of other witnesses reflected the opposite. Id. Although 
Gerety's testimony was in dispute, the jury was prevented in the 
fact-finding process from evaluating her demeanor. The omission 
of Gerety's live testimony tipped the balance against Smith by 
allowing the State to build a case against him around hearsay 
testimony and preventing Smith from confronting a controversial 
witness. The conviction should be reversed and the case should 
be remanded for a new and fair trial, omitting use of the 
unconstitutional hearsay testimony. 
REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION 
While the evidence clearly is legally insufficient to 
establish the offense of tampering against Smith, the issues 
warrant argument and a published decision. Prosecutors and trial 
courts should be reminded in explicit terms that in a tampering 
case it is necessary for prosecutors to show that the item that 
allegedly has been "tampered with" is somehow relevant to 
establish or disprove a fact in a proceeding or investigation. 
That is, they must show that the item has evidentiary value. 
Otherwise, persons may continue to be charged with the offense of 
tampering simply for discarding meaningless items. 
With respect to the severance issue and the construction of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l)(a), although sibling states provide 
direction to the courts, argument and a published opinion would 
provide the bar and bench with more pointed guidance in applying 
the statute. Finally, because trial courts continue to permit 
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the admission into evidence of controversial, unsubstantiated 
hearsay testimony without an adequate showing of unavailability, 
an opinion reminding the bar and bench of the requirements of 
Rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence, and the strictures of the 
Confrontation Clause is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Smith respectfully requests that if this Court determines 
that the State failed to present legally sufficient evidence of 
tampering with evidence against Smith, this Court should enter an 
order reversing the conviction and dismissing the case against 
Smith. If this Court determines that the trial court erred (1) 
in refusing to sever the charges against Smith, or (2) in 
admitting Gerety's prior statements into evidence at trial, this 
Court should enter an order reversing the conviction and 
remanding this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 1*1 tL day of January, 1996. 
LT&DA M T JONES A 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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The motion of jf{ <§0ft rftWo enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is fc£granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendantjjaying been convicted by J&a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea^f ^contest; of the offense of / &i+*ptrjrr\<? i of nacon , a felony 
of the JD^beQTe%JO a class misdemeanor, beirfg now present in/sourt and ready for sentence and 
represented byK • ^ < ^ * ^ V p C a n d the State being represented hyVJ. folm/c/^ is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of 
tKnot to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
years and which may be for life; 
* ) - 2 i - ^ 
UJ nui I U BAueea years, *
 N A /—/*&-/!/£* 
jL and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ^ V W > -£^J^ ^ Vc^Sd^ 
D aftd ordered to pay restitution irvthe amount of s * to (L. 
itence is tpVun concurrently witn D such sen ^jr concurrently 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
JSK uoon motion of D State, D Defense, T^Couct, -Count(s) 
'JL*y£_ 
Defendant is granted a stay of th£ 
custody of this Court and under tr 






bove (D pris n) s tence and placed on probation in the 
1
 supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
^C Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyWor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, w£Lej£jjefendant shall be confined 
^and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commiti 
sQ Commitment shall issue 
DATED this / o day of
 y 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page j-«j-
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may 
consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defen-
dant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the 
time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had 
been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good 
cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous con-
duct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecu-
tion. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecu-
tion has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, 
the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both 
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the 
defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the 
defense argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argu-
ment of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alter-
nate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. 
If no~ alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the 
number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a 
new trial ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instruc-
tions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received as 
evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with him any notes 
of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any 
other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept to-
gether in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Ex-
cept by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not 
allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to 
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the 
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations 
or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise 
the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry 
and the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser in-
cluded offense. 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the of-
fense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until 
the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may 
be just and proper under the circumstances. 
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence. 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with 
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a 
proceeding or investigation. 
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the 
offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in 
their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant 
is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor 
and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or 
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, 
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or 
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both 
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more 
than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a 
single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials 
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief 
as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived 
if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a 
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to 
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to 
introduce in evidence at the trial. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death 
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's 
statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by pro-
cess or other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of 
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing 
of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hear-
ing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in 
compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if 
the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action 
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or crimi-
nal action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing 
that the declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in 
good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of 
its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary 
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, 
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made 
the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to ex-
pose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the ac-
cused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indi-
cate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement con-
cerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legiti-
macy, relationship by blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other 
similar fact of personal or family history, even though the declarant had 
no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a 
statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another 
person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or 
marriage or was ao intimately associated with the other's family as to be 
likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (6) the statement is more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known 
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, 
including the name and address of the declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
